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FORECAST FOR THE NEXT EON: APPLIED COSMOLOGY AND THE 
LONG-TERM FATE OF INTELLIGENT BEINGS 
 
Abstract. Cosmology seems extremely remote from everyday human practice and 
experience. It is usually taken for granted that cosmological data cannot rationally 
influence our beliefs about the fate of humanity—and possible other intelligent 
species—except perhaps in the extremely distant future, when the question of heat 
death (in an ever-expanding universe) becomes actual. Here, an attempt is made to 
show that it may become a practical issue much sooner, if an intelligent community 
wishes to maximize its creative potential. New developments in the fields of anthropic 
self-selection and physical eschatology give solid foundations to such a conclusion. 
This may open some new (and possibly urgent) issues in the areas of future policy 
making and transhumanist studies generally. It may also give us a slightly better 
perspective on the SETI endeavor.  
  
 
The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes, and secret 
motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human 
empire, to the effecting of all things possible. 
 
       Francis Bacon, The New Atlantis (1626) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: PHYSICAL ESCHATOLOGY 
  
Living beings change their environments and are changed by their environments in 
turn. This simple truth has become especially pertinent within the framework of 
astrobiology. Even before the onset of the explosive development of this field we are 
witnesses of, the fact that even simple lifeforms can influence its physical and 
chemical environment on the planetary scale has been widely known. The stock 
example is the one of the Earth's atmosphere, which is markedly out of chemical 
equilibrium due to the presence of the biosphere, and has been so for billions of years. 
As the author of the Gaia hypothesis, James Lovelock wrote: “Almost everything 
about its composition seems to violate the laws of chemistry... The air we breathe... 
can only be an artifact maintained in a steady state far from chemical equilibrium by 
biological properties.” (Lovelock 1988) Recently publicized projects dealing with 
detection of exoplanetary biospheres all rely on this simple fact. In somewhat 
different light, we are all sadly aware of the impact of human activities on the 
biosphere, Earth's climate and Earth's circumplanetary space.  
 It is reasonable, at least, to conclude that the magnitude and spatial extent of 
these biological influences increase with time spanned by the activities of the life 
forms considered. In that case, the interplay between physical and biological evolution 
of any chosen environment has to be disentangled with special care when 
characteristic timescales of the two types of processes become similar. These 
difficulties and uncertainties are well-illustrated by recent fierce debates over the 
causes of the short-term climatic change. Since it deals with the very widest 
conceivable environments, the question of relevant timescales for changes induced by 
life and intelligence is very relevant to the astrobiological endeavor. Human existence 
so far is too short for the conclusions in this respect to be drawn from experience. In 
order to consider the impact of humans (and, by analogy, other intelligent 
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communities), on the surrounding universe, we need to investigate what physics may 
tell us about its future.   
Physical eschatology is a rather young branch of astrophysics, dealing with the 
future fate of astrophysical objects, as well as the universe itself. Landmark studies in 
physical eschatology are those of Rees (1969), Dyson (1979), Tipler (1986) and 
Adams and Laughlin (1997). Some relevant issues have been discussed in the 
monograph of Barrow and Tipler (1986), as well as several popular-level books 
(Islam 1983; Davies 1994; Adams and Laughlin 1999); detailed bibliography can be 
found in Ćirković (2002). Since the distinction between knowledge in classical 
cosmology and physical eschatology depends on the distinction between past and 
future, several issues in the physics and philosophy of time are relevant to the 
assessment of eschatological results and vice versa.  
As of recently, we have been witnessing a true revolution in cosmology, 
promising for the first time since Einstein and de Sitter, to finally fix the “Big Three” 
basic cosmological parameters: cosmological matter density Ω, Hubble constant H0, 
and cosmological constant Λ (for a classical textbook treatment of these see Peebles 
1993). Tremendous success of the two projects of observing supernovae of Type Ia in 
distant galaxies (Perlmutter et al. 1999; Riess et al. 2001), as well as constantly 
improving observations of the microwave background radiation (Lineweaver 1998; 
Knox, Christensen, and Skordis 2001) are most to be credited for this revolution. 
These observational projects have demonstrated that the expansion of the universe is, 
contrary to our intuitions, not decellerating, but on the contrary: universe is expanding 
at ever-increasing rate! This is possible only if there is some sort of “exotic” stuff 
dominating the dynamics and acting as “antigravity”; since Einstein, we know for 
such a candidate: cosmological constant. According to the emerging picture, the 
universe is globally flat—corresponding to Ω =1—but is dominated by cosmological 
constant (vacuum energy) which makes for about 70% of the total energy density.  (In 
technical terms, Ω = Ωm + ΩΛ, Ωm being the contribution of all matter, and ΩΛ the one 
of the cosmological constant; we now have ΩΛ ≈ 0.7, Ωm ≈ 0.3.) The present 
expansion is exponentially accelerating from a turning point, a few billion years ago, 
when the dynamical effects of the cosmological constant first overwhelmed those of 
gravitating matter.  
The outlook this paradigm suggests for the future is rather bleak. Universe will 
not only expand forever, but will do so at ever-increasing speed. Gravitationally 
bound structures, such as galaxies, galaxy clusters and superclusters will become 
more and more isolated in the future. As noticed by several investigators (Rindler 
1956; Krauss and Starkman 2000; Ćirković and Bostrom 2001), cosmological 
constant acts to create an event horizon, i.e. closed surface across which 
communication is impossible at all times. This effectively means that any perturbation 
larger the size of horizon cannot affect us. On the other hand, the inexorable rise of 
entropy will degrade matter configurations in each of the regions forever surrounded 
by event horizons, and the state very close to the classically imagined heat-death (e.g. 
Eddington 1931) will ensue. The processes of star-formation and stellar 
nucleosynthesis, at present the major sources of entropy production, will cease, and 
the remaining stellar remnants will be slowly degraded by proton decay and 
gravitational collapse. Even black holes will inevitably evaporate on tremendously 
long timescales through the Hawking evaporation. Finally, nothing will remain except 
the incredibly redshifted thermal photons of wavelengths comparable to the horizon 
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size, since even the remaining not annihilated electrons and positrons will be 
separated by distances far surpassing the horizon size.  
A necessary ingredient in most serious discussions of physical eschatology is 
the presence of living and intelligent systems in the future of the universe (which ex 
hypothesi did not exist in its past). Dyson has been the first to boldly spell it out in 
1979: 
 
It is impossible to calculate in detail the long-range future of the universe 
without including the effects of life and intelligence. It is impossible to 
calculate the capabilities of life and intelligence without touching, at least 
peripherally, philosophical questions. If we are to examine how intelligent 
life may be able to guide the physical development of the universe for its 
own purposes, we cannot altogether avoid considering what the values and 
purposes of intelligent life may be. But as soon as we mention the words 
value and purpose, we run into one of the most firmly entrenched taboos 
of twentieth-century science. 
 
The future of universes containing life and intelligence is essentially different from 
the future of universes devoid of such forms of complex organized matter; as well as 
different from the past of the same universes in which complexity was lower. This is 
the crucial point of contact with the astrobiological discourse. In a similar vein, John 
A. Wheeler has written in a beautiful paper on the relationship of quantum mechanics 
and cosmology (Wheeler 1988): 
 
Minuscule though the part is today that such acts of observer-participancy 
play in the scheme of things, there are billions of years to come. There are 
billions upon billions of living places yet to be inhabited. The coming 
explosion of life opens the door to an all-encompassing role for observer-
participancy: to build, in time to come, no minor part of what we call its 
past—our past, present and future—but this whole vast world. 
 
Obviously, most of the discussions of place and the long-term future of intelligent 
observers in the universe rely on some assumptions pertaining to the relevant 
motivations of intelligent communities. Various assumptions have been used in the 
existing literature, the most interesting one being that the expansion of such 
communities and the consequent technologization of space are carried out by 
particular technical means, notably von Neumann probes (von Neumann 1966; Tipler 
1986, 1994). However, even its most fervent supporters do not claim that such a 
course of action on the part of intelligent communities is necessary, exclusive, or even 
dominant. On the contrary, the strength of the celebrated Fermi's “paradox” lies in its 
necessity of exclusiveness of extraterrestrial behaviour (e.g. Brin 1983; Hanson 
1998a,b). To various arguments invoked to support the conjecture that the expansion 
and colonization of space are generic characteristics of intelligent communities, one 
may add  the one which we shall attempt to describe in this essay, formulated as the 
natural generalization of the concept of self-interest. The plan of exposition is as 
follows. Before we consider the main task, in Sections 3 and 4, it is necessary to 
define an extremely useful auxiliary notion (Section 2). Sec. 5 summarizes our ideas 
and a couple of rather technical issues of cosmology are relegated to Appendices, for 
the sake of easier reading.  
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2. OBSERVER-MOMENTS AND SELF-SAMPLING ASSUMPTION 
 
When examining the possibility of life and intelligence playing a significant role on 
ever-larger spatial and temporal scales, one essential constraint to take into account is 
the so-called Doomsday Argument (henceforth DA; for a survey of already 
voluminous literature on the subject, see Leslie 1996; Bostrom 2001a, 2002; Olum 
2002). Roughly, DA argues from our temporal position, according to a principle that 
directly corresponds to the way other applications of anthropic reasoning argue from 
the expected typicality of our position in the universe. It was conceived (but not 
published) by the astrophysicist Brandon Carter in the early 1980s, and it has been 
first exposed in print by John Leslie in 1989 and in a Nature article by Richard Gott in 
1993. The most comprehensive discussion of the issues involved is Leslie’s 
monograph of 1996, The End of The World. The core idea can be expressed through 
the following urn-ball experiment. Place two large urns in front of you, one of which 
you know contains ten balls, the other a million, but you do not know which is which. 
The balls in each urn are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, ... Now take one ball at random from the 
left urn; it shows the number 7. This clearly is a strong indication that the left urn 
contains only ten balls. If the odds originally were fifty-fifty (identically-looking 
urns), an application of Bayes' theorem gives the posterior probability that the left urn 
is the one with only ten balls as Ppost (n=10) = 0.99999. Now consider the case where 
instead of two urns you have two possible models of humanity, and instead of balls 
you have human individuals, ranked according to birth order. One model suggests that 
the human race will soon become extinct (or at least that the number of individuals 
will be greatly reduced), and as a consequence the total number of humans that ever 
will have existed is about 100 billion. The other model indicates that humans will 
colonize other planets, spread through the Galaxy, and continue to exist for many 
future millennia; we consequently can take the number of humans in this model to be 
of the order of, say, 1018. As a matter of fact, you happen to find that your rank is 
about sixty billion. According to Carter and Leslie, we should reason in the same way 
as we did with the urn balls. That you should have a rank of sixty billion is much 
more likely if only 100 billion humans ever will have lived than if the number was 
1018. Therefore, by Bayes' theorem, you should update your beliefs about mankind's 
prospects and realize that an impending doomsday is much more probable than you 
thought previously. Here we are not interested in DA per se, but in one notion whose 
introduction in the field of anthropic thinking has been motivated by DA. 
 Namely, DA and similar probabilistic arguments have been grounded in the 
basic equality of all observers within a reference class.i However, this may be 
insufficient in most realistic situations, and may well misrepresent the actual 
contribution of the attribute “intelligent” to the ontological status of an “intelligent 
observer”. Therefore, Bostrom (2002) makes the following attempt at definition, 
which we shall accept in further discussion: 
 
...We can take a first step towards specifying the sampling density by 
substituting “observer-moments” for “observers”. Different observers may 
live differently long lives, be awake different amounts of time, spend 
different amounts of time engaging in anthropic reasoning etc. If we chop 
up the stretch of time an observer exists into discrete observer-moments 
then we have a natural way of weighing in these differences. We can 
redefine the reference class to consist of all observer-moments that will 
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ever have existed. That is, we can upgrade SSA to something we can call 
the Strong Self-Sampling Assumption: 
 
(SSSA) Every observer at every moment should reason as if their present 
observer-moment were randomly sampled from the set of all observer-
moments. 
 
An additional motivation for introducing observer-moments comes directly from 
thinking about the future: it is difficult to predict the properties of future observers, in 
particular their longevity and the metabolic/information-processing rates. For 
instance, the DA conclusion may turn out to be perfectly correct if humanity achieves 
immortality coupled with zero population growth; it seem obviously unfair to count 
observers (instead of observer-moments) in the same manner before and after 
transition to the “immortal” regime. Thus, counting observer-moments may be a much 
more tractable approach, since one may absorb all changes in, say, metabolic rate—
via Dyson's biological scaling hypothesis (Dyson 1979), or convenient 
generalizations—in the simple arithmetic changes in the budget of observer-moments. 
This also offers the simplest unifying framework for treating various kinds of 
observers, originating at various locations in spacetime. As we shall now see, 
however, the tally of observer-moments is influenced by cosmological factors in two 
different ways. The first and most obvious one is contained in the relevant limits that 
follow from cosmological boundary conditions. The second, dealing with the impact 
of cosmological studies on the possible social and technological policies of intelligent 
communities, however, has not been treated in the literature so far. 
Following SSSA, we obtain a method of quantitatively comparing the measure 
of “success” of different (actual or possible) civilizations. Plausibly, one may expect 
that an advanced civilization will seek to maximize its total tally of observer-
moments, since it is a necessary precondition for maximization of any other 
existential or creative goals. Let us denote this conjecture with a special symbol: 
 
Conjecture (*): An intelligent community tends to maximize its total 
number of observer-moments, ceteris paribus.   
       
Of course, we are assuming here a long-term behaviour (since we are interested in 
investigation of interaction between cosmological and intelligent factors). Obviously, 
the validity of the conjecture (*) is highly uncertain, since we know so little about the 
nature (and especially physical groundings) of intelligence and mental phenomena in 
general. However, we wish to argue here that (*) is useful as a working hypothesis, 
from which meaningful conclusions may be drawn. Let us note that (*) is not 
exclusive: it is enough for our purposes that maximization of the number of observer-
moments is just one of the goals of any intelligent society. 
Let us denote the total tally of observer-moments of an intelligent community 
over its entire history by Θ. Thus, the variational form of 
 
0=Θδ        (1) 
 
when applied over all possible civilization's histories describes the desired future in 
the most general form, i.e. gives a mathematical expression to our conjecture (*).ii As 
usual in the variational calculus, the solution is sought which satisfies a number of 
independent constraints; hypothetical aims an goals of a civilization different from (*) 
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may be treated as some of such constraints. However, it is illusory to hope to explicate 
the functional Θ in such general terms, since the problem is, obviously, extravagantly 
difficult. Instead, we shall use a greatly simplified “temporal” model, in which we 
assume that the civilization is characterized by discrete individual observers, 
countable (with their observer-moments) at any given time. This may be 
mathematically expressed as:  
 
( ) ( ) ,max
min
∫=Θ
t
t
dtttN σ       (2) 
 
where N(t) is the number of observers at epoch t of cosmic time, and 〈σ(t)〉 the 
corresponding average density of their observer-moments.iii The lifetime of the 
civilization considered spans the interval from tmin to tmax, where the upper limit 
may—in principle—be infinite. It is important to emphasize that we use physical time 
here (i.e. we acknowledge the validity of the Weyl postulate which enables one to 
define a universal, “cosmic” timescale), although it is possible to change coordinates 
to some subjective timescale if more appropriate, in the manner of Dyson's biological 
scaling hypothesis (Dyson 1979; Krauss and Starkman 2000), or (in)famous Tipler's 
Omega-point theory (Tipler 1994).iv There are at least two distinct ways in which 
cosmological parameters enter into eq. (2): 
 1. Most obviously, the values of the cosmological parameters determine 
absolute limits on tmin and tmax. If the entire lifetime of the universe is equal to τ, then 
tmax ≤ τ. In addition, tmin > 0, but also one may state that tmin ≥ τ∗, where τ∗ is the 
epoch of formation of the first stars of sufficiently high metallicity for the processes 
of chemical and biological evolution to take place.  
 2. The shape of the function N(t) is dependent on the cosmological parameters 
when the discrete nature of matter distribution is taken into account. Namely, the 
power spectrum of cosmological density perturbations determines which objects form 
as result of gravitational attraction and decoupling from the universal Hubble 
expansion (for a modern textbook treatment see Peebles 1993). On the other hand, the 
size of the matter aggregates like stars, galaxies, etc. is essential for answering the 
question of how large a part of the rest mass can be converted into energy for the 
purpose of (intelligent) information processing. In essence, the cosmological power 
spectrum is the ultimate source of the famous Kardashev's taxonomy of possible 
advanced intelligent communities, to which we shall return later.  
It is plausible to assume that the maximal number of observers is proportional 
to the energy consumed for such purposes, which can be mathematically written as 
 
( ) ,
min
max ∫∫∝ t
t
i
V
dtdVqtN ρ      (3) 
 
where ρi denotes the relevant energy density, and q < 1 is the efficiency of whatever 
energy extraction process a civilization uses. The reason why we consider the 
maximal number of observers is that the exact number, of course, depends on the 
sociological factors which are completely outside the scope of the present study. It 
may also strongly depend on the level of technology (e.g. Sandberg 2000), and may 
radically decrease with further scientific and technological advancement (like in the 
cyberpunk scenarios of “collective consciousness” development). Neglecting this, we 
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perceive that at least this upper limit is still cosmologically determined, since both the 
relevant densities ρi and integration bounds are contained in the cosmological 
discourse. Of course, the density 〈σ(t)〉 is even less tractable from the point of view of 
the present knowledge, since it may be expected to hinge crucially upon biological 
factors of which we know little. Advances in the algorithmic information theory and 
its application to biological systems, as well as artificial life, might eventually shed 
some light on this difficult issue (e.g. Chaitin 1977; Langton 1986). However, for the 
purposes of the present study, it is enough to assume that it is the non-zero function of 
time which either increases or decreases slower than exponential.  
 
 
3. COSMOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: A STORY 
 
How does the number of observer moments Θ tally with various cosmological 
models, including the realistic one? Let us first note that there is doubt as to whether 
such thing as the exact model can ever be reached. Several simplifications come 
handy at this point. Sufficiently high degree of symmetry leads to familiar Friedmann 
models (or generalization of them including the cosmological constant), and 
sufficiently small perturbations can be treated in a familiar way. However, even the 
general outline on which the future fate of a universe depends may not be obvious 
until some critical epoch occurs to any internal observers. In particular, as discussed 
in detail in an illuminating essay by Krauss and Turner (1999), realistic universes are 
notoriously difficult to analyze completely, due to the possible presence of very large 
(super-horizon) perturbations which enter the visible universe only at some later 
epoch. From the point of view of internal observers, there is no possibility to avoid 
this ambiguity. In such a position, it is natural that the priorities leading to 
maximization of the number of observer-moments in (2) are contingent on the 
contemporary cosmological knowledge. As Krauss and Starkman (2000) vividly put 
it, “funding priorities for cosmological observations will become exponentially more 
important as time goes on.”  
 Let us now investigate the following imaginary situation. A civilization 
inhabiting a particular, sufficiently symmetric universe, develops both theoretical and 
observational astronomy to the point where it can make useful working models of 
their universe as a whole. After one equivalent of an Einstein of that particular world 
develops a formalism to describe curved spacetime at the largest scales, an equivalent 
of Hubble discovers universal expansion, and the equivalents of Penzias and Wilson 
discover the remnants of primordial fireball, leading cosmologists begin to support the 
concept of a flat baryonic universe with ΩB = Ω ≈ 1. At first it seems that all 
observations can be accomodated in the framework of such a model (we suppose that 
light elements' abundances, for instant, are not inconsistent with such high baryonic 
density, contrary to the situation in our observable universe!). Some circumstantial 
support for this model comes from ingenious theoreticians of that civilization, who 
discover that the coupling of a universal scalar field to gravity leads to exponential 
expansion during the very early epochs. This inflationary phase in the history of such 
a universe leads to the prediction that Ω - 1 = ε ≈ 10-5, while it is not clear whether 
the universe is marginally closed or marginally open. In the latter case (favored by 
most of the theoreticians in such a universe), the number of galaxies in their universe 
is infinite, and therefore such a universe offers a very optimistic prospect for the 
survival of intelligence and life. There is no event horizon in such a universe, and the 
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particle horizon is (very) roughly given as the age of the universe in light years, i.e. 
the maximal path traversed by light along the observer's past light cone. What are the 
prospects of intelligent beings surviving indefinitely in such a universe? 
Gradually, bolder scientists begin to tackle physical eschatological issues. An 
equivalent of Dyson on that world reckons that this civilization can, in principle, 
indefinitely survive while exploiting its sources of energy in larger and larger volumes 
(tmax = ∞). In addition, it was suggested by some extremely speculative and ingenious 
cosmologists, that a non-zero cosmological shear can be manifested in later epochs, 
providing in this manner additional energy which will be proportional to the volume 
of the technologized space (although this option has not been studied enough). The 
predominant attitude toward the maximization of (2) is, therefore, very optimistic and 
not characterized by any sense of urgency. There are physical grounds to expect Θmax 
= ∞. Everybody is happy and relaxed. It seems natural, and even desirable, to seek 
perfection in domains like the quality of life, individual development and aesthetics, 
rather than devote energies in projects of space colonization, since there is arguably 
enough time for everything.   
 Suddenly, a new and unexpected twist occurs. New cosmological 
observations, and in particular two superbly designed projects detecting standard 
candles at large distances in order to make a best-fit estimate of the Hubble constant, 
indicate a spectacular overthrow of the ruling paradigm. After the dust settles (which 
lasts for years, and probably decades), the new paradigm suggest that the universe is 
still geometrically flat, but dominated by the cosmological constant term Λ in such a 
way that Ω = ΩB + ΩΛ = 1, ΩB = 0.1, ΩΛ = 0.9. Now, the situation radically changes 
with respect to the envisaged number of possible observer-moments given by (*). The 
universe is now found to possess not only a particle, but an event horizon also, 
defined as the surface through which any form of communication is impossible at all 
epochs. This is a consequence of the fact that after a phase of power-law expansion, 
the exponential expansion generated by Λ sets in, thus creating a second (future and 
final) inflationary phase in the history of the universe (see Appendix I for some 
technical details).  
 There is further bad news for such a civilization. The decrease in the metabolic 
temperature envisaged by the Dyson-equivalent can not continue indefinitely, as it 
was possible before the “cosmological revolution”, since the de Sitter universe 
possesses a minimal temperature, a circumstance following from the quantum field 
theory, and described in some detail in the Appendix I. This is an extremely small 
temperature, but still finite, and below it nothing can be cooled without expending 
precious free energy. Thus, the temperature scaling may be continued only to the final 
value of tmax in (2). In addition, one may not use any shear energy, since the 
equivalent of the so-called “cosmological no-hair” theorem guarantees that no 
significant shear remains during the exponential expansion (Gibbons and Hawking 
1977).  
 It seems obvious that the “cosmological revolution” will have important social 
and political consequences if the desire of maximizing Θ in (2) remains (or becomes) 
the legitimate goal of the considered civilization. There could be no more leisurely 
activities in the framework of the second paradigm. Although survival cannot be 
indefinite, it still seems that it can be prolonged for a very, very long time—but only 
if one starts early enough. Besides funding for cosmological observations, one may 
expect that funding for interstellar and even intergalactic expansion will suddenly rise. 
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Colonization of other stellar and (ultimately) galactic systems should better start early 
in the Λ-dominated universe!   
 
 
4. DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN ESTIMATES 
 
This story can teach us several lessons. It seems that we are currently in the middle of 
the “cosmological revolution” described above, although a not so dramatic one, since 
there was never a consensus on the values of cosmological parameters or the nature of 
matter constituents in the actual human cosmology. Also, as we have mentioned 
above, the currently inferred value for the vacuum density ΩΛ is somewhat smaller, 
being about 0.7 (e.g. Perlmutter et al. 1999; Zehavi and Dekel 1999), corresponding to 
Ωm = 1 – ΩΛ ≈ 0.3. However, the qualitative nature of the revolution and the implied 
potential change in the entire spectrum of human social and technological activities 
are analogous.   
Of course, this counterfactual example may be regarded as rather conservative. 
One may imagine much more drastic changes in the dominant cosmological 
paradigm. Let us, for instance, suppose that for some reason most cosmologists did 
accept the classical steady state theory of Bondi, Gold and Hoyle in late 1940-ies, and 
that in the same time the development of radio astronomy has been dampened for 
several more decades. Let us recall the basic tenets of this, now largely forgotten, but 
historically enormously influential cosmological theory. Bondi and Gold derived the 
steady state theory from what they called the Perfect Cosmological Principle, which 
can be simply expressed as the homogeneity of the universe in 4-dimensional 
spacetime (instead of just in 3-dimensional space, the latter statement being, since 
Eddington and Milne called the Cosmological Principle). This simple postulate has a 
tremendous wealth of consequences, the most important (and the most controversial) 
being the continuous creation of matter at very small rates throughout spacetime. As a 
consequence, as old galaxies recede toward infinity and disappear (since the steady-
state universe also possesses a horizon), new galaxies are formed which take their 
place in an everlasting and—on large scales—unchanging universe. The same process 
of creation enables matter to stay at constant average entropy throughout eons and 
avoid the menace of the heat death.  
The attitude of humanitarian thinkers seeking to maximize Θ could very well 
be encouraged by the steady state concept of the creation of low-entropy matter in the 
manner conserving the density of matter fields. Not only did one have tmax = ∞, one 
should also expect limt→∞ N(t) = ∞, and there would have been no plausible reason to 
expect σ(t) to be anything but constant or even an increasing function of time. From 
the particular human point of view, therefore, the steady state cosmology offered one 
of the most optimistic visions of the future.v (This is somewhat ironical, since the 
steady state model predicts essentially the same exponentially expanding spacetime as 
the Λ-dominated models.) As we know, after the fierce cosmological battle in 1950s 
and early 1960s, the steady state theory has been finally overthrown by the sensational 
discoveries of QSOs and the cosmic microwave background, as described in a 
colorful recent history of Kragh (1996). There has been no historical consensus about 
the exact cosmological model accounting for observations ever since, but it seems that 
we are on the verge of reaching one. However, it is conceivable that the cosmology of 
some other civilization passes directly from the steady state into the Λ-dominated 
paradigm. This seems, curiously enough, at least in one respect easier and more 
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natural than what has occurred in the actual history (see Appendix II). This paradigm 
shift must be accompanied by a shift in technological and social priorities if one 
expects Θ to be maximized. Such implications are present even if our conjecture (*) is 
correct only selectively or on the average. 
However, changes in the cosmological paradigm currently underway in the 
real world should not be regarded as the end of the story. As mentioned above, 
perturbations of the scale larger than the horizon scale are expected to enter our 
visible universe only at some late epoch. In the light of the argument above, one may 
expect that whatever the cosmological paradigm is established on the timescale of 
next ∼101 years, may be upset by observing the perturbations on superhorizon scales 
(Krauss and Turner 1999). A recent intriguing study of Tipler (1999) shows that the 
cosmological conclusions reached by local observations (i.e. those in the vicinity of 
the Milky Way) can be highly misleading, and that one should be on guard with 
respect to the results of any local measurement of cosmological parameters. 
 Let us try to estimate the effects of a belated technologization to the lowest 
order. It should not be especially emphasized that any such estimate is notoriously 
difficult, speculative and on the very fringe of the domain of founded scientific 
hypothesizing; some of the reasons, already mentioned, include our almost perfect 
ignorance of the evolutionary possibilities in the social domain, as well as the 
influence of various technological advances on the average census of observer-
moments per observer, 〈σ(t)〉. Even the simpler part of the problem, the estimate on 
the possibilities and modes of evolution of the number of observers N(t), poses almost 
intractable difficulties. We may be virtually certain that the current exponential 
population growth of humanity will be arrested at some future date, but whether it will 
result in transition to some other (power-law?) growing function, or tend to a stable 
asymptotic limit is impossible to establish at this time. There are certainly several 
timescales relevant for the history of an advanced technological community, which 
are related to the “quantized” nature of physical resources alluded to above (and 
which are, ultimately, consequences of the cosmological power spectrum). This may 
roughly correspond to Kardashev's famous classification of advanced intelligent 
communities into three types, depending on the energy resources available (e.g. Tarter 
2001 and references therein). By allowing for “ergodicity” we may treat Kardashev's 
types as temporal phases in (unobstructed) progress of any single intelligent 
community; we would only like to add, for reasons to be explained below, the “Type 
IV”, corresponding to a civilization successfully managing the energy resources of the 
largest gravitationally bound structure it originated in. If our position is 
cosmologically typical, these would be galaxy superclusters. However, there has been 
no estimates of the timescales required for transition between the types (and possible 
intermediate timescales corresponding to radically new technologies of energy 
extraction; for instance the Penrose-Christodoulou process of extracting the 
gravitational energy of black holes).  
The baryonic mass of the Local Supercluster (henceforth LS) is of the order of 
1015 solar masses (Oort 1983, and references therein), and its luminosity several times 
1012 solar luminosities. Let us suppose that humanity will eventually technologize the 
entire spatial volume of LS, and gather all its negentropy resources for information 
processing. Let us also suppose that at whatever time humans (or posthumans) embark 
on the process of galactic and intergalactic colonization, the historical path of such 
colonization will be essentially the same. This is a reasonable assumption, since we 
expect that the colonization timescale is significantly smaller from the cosmological 
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timescales characterizing large-scale changes in the distribution of matter within LS. 
If we further assume (as many of the prominent anthropic thinkers, following Carter’s 
well-known argument, do) that we are the first technological civilization within LS, 
we may ask the question how many observer-moments (or conceivable human lives 
and experiences) we loose by postponing the onset of colonization by ∆t? The 
simplest (“zero-order”) estimate is simply to assume that all entropy produced by the 
physical processes in LS during that interval is proportional to the loss of information 
from the “pool” available to the presumed “Type IV” future hypercivilization (i.e. the 
one exploiting the energy resources of LS). The major entropy producing process at 
present (and on the timescales relevant to the issue; see Adams and Laughlin 1997) is 
stellar nucleosynthesis. Its products are high-entropy photons escaping to intergalactic 
(and subsequently intersupercluster) space and being there further redshifted due to 
the universal expansion. Using the Brillouin (1962) inequality, we may write 
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where sL is the Solar luminosity, and q is the (time-averaged) fraction of free energy 
which hypercivilization converts into work for its computing devices. We expect that 
the temperature T at which computations are performed will be close to the 
temperature of the cosmic microwave background since the timescale even for the 
colonization of a huge object like LS is short by cosmological standards, and thus 
such colonization is essentially isothermal. The quantity of information lost per 100 
years of delay in starting the colonization is astonishing by any standard. For a 
conservative estimate of q = 0.1, and using Dyson’s (1979) estimate of complexity—
be it program-size complexity of Chaitin or any similar measure—of an average 
present-day human being 2310≈hQ bits (a quantity which is likely to grow in future, 
especially in the hypothetical posthuman stage of our evolution, but which is still a 
useful benchmark), the number of potentially viable human lifetimes lost per 100 
years of postponing the onset of galactic colonization is simply (if we assume that the 
luminosity fraction in the equation above is unity, which is probably an underestimate 
by a factor of a few) 
 
 46105~ ×∆=∆
hQ
In . (!!!)     (5) 
 
Of course, this is only the total integrated loss; if for some currently unknown 
reason the colonization of LS is impossible or unfeasible, while colonization of some 
of its substructures is possible and feasible, this huge number should be multiplied by 
a fraction of the accessible baryonic matter currently undergoing a significant entropy 
increase (essentially luminous stars). On the other hand, our estimate is actually 
conservative for the following reasons. There are other entropy-producing processes 
apart from stellar radiation (notably the stellar black-hole formation which becomes 
more and more important as the time passes), and therefore the lost quantity of 
potentially useful information is likely to be higher. Another very pertinent reason 
why this estimate should be taken as the absolute lower limit is the entire spectrum of 
existential risks (see Bostrom 2001b), which have not been taken into account here. 
 12
Namely, the realistic history of posthuman civilization would be the convolution of 
the integrand functions in (2) with a risk function frisk(t) describing the cumulative 
probability of existential risks up to the epoch t (and their presumed impact on the 
observer-moment tally): 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )∫=Θ max
min
t
t
risk dtttNtf σ .     (6) 
 
Obviously, this function would be biased toward higher levels at small values of t (as 
measured, for instance, from the present epoch for humans), since smaller—i.e. those 
not colonizing the universe—civilizations are more prone to all sorts of existential 
risks. In other words, existential risks act to “filter out” observer-moments viable in 
the long-run from the pool of all conceivable observer-moments associated with a 
concrete intelligent species.vi  
Thus, the risk inherent in a “colonization later” policy makes our estimate very 
conservative (or “optimistic” from the point of view of lost observer-moments). 
However, this estimate possesses the virtue of being a natural extension of the Dyson 
concept of  development of a Type II (Kardashev) civilization: in order to truly 
technologize the domicile planetary system, an advanced society must strive to 
capture and exploit the entire stellar energy output of its home star, via Dyson spheres 
or similar contraptions (Dyson 1960; Sandberg 2000). Mutatis mutandis, the same 
arguments apply to larger scales of density fluctuations, and in the Λ-dominated 
cosmological model we are supplied with a natural cut-off at larger scales.  
 
 
5. SUMMARY 
 
The above said testifies to the simple truth that an awareness of the cosmological 
situation is a first step toward true long-term planning for any community of 
intelligent observers interested in self-preservation and achieving maximum creative 
potential. However, in an evolving universe, the issue of timing seems to set stringent 
limits on the efficiency with which intelligent communities can fulfil their goals. 
While those limits are certainly to be the subject of much debate and discussion in the 
future, the very fact of their existence makes cosmology interesting from the 
transhumanist perspective. Decision-making performed today, as far as humanity is 
concerned, may have enormous consequences over very long timescales. In particular, 
an overly conservative approach to space colonization and technologization, may 
result (and in fact might have already resulted) in the loss of a substantial fraction of 
all the possible observer-moments humanity could have had achieved. It is our modest 
hope that this cursory study will contribute to the wider and livelier discussion of 
these issues and help to reach other, more precise predictions for intelligence’s 
cosmological future. 
Finally, let us note that this approach is not necessarily the only manner in 
which cosmology may enter our everyday life. If some approaches within the 
fundaments of quantum mechanics and its links to the human conscience are correct, 
we may find ourselves in a situation where the cosmological boundary conditions 
determine the nature of our perceptions and self-awareness (Wheeler 1988; Dugić, 
Ćirković and Raković 2000). This differs markedly from our approach in this essay, 
which is based on classical cosmology (as well as classical logic and probability 
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theory). One may imagine that in the future the correct physical theory of conscience 
will incorporate these elements, and that they will a fortiori play some role in any 
policy-making attempts.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
The behavior of a universe with a large positive vacuum energy density—commonly 
(and somewhat imprecisely) known as the cosmological constant—Λ has been 
investigated in several recent publications even before the cosmological supernovae 
began to throw light on its reality (the major review is Carroll, Press and Turner 1992; 
see also Krauss and Turner 1999; Ćirković and Bostrom 2000). In the Λ-dominated 
epoch, the scale factor behaves according to the de Sitter law, i.e. 
 
 ( ) ( )HtRtR exp0= ,      (I.1)   
 
where the “effective” Hubble constant is given as 3/Λ=H . The relationship of Λ 
and ΩΛ is 2
0
2
3H
c Λ=ΩΛ , where c is the speed of light, ΩΛ is the cosmological density of 
the vacuum and H0 ≡ 100 h km s-1 Mpc is the present-day Hubble constant 
parametrized in such way that h is a dimensionless number of order unity. Obviously, 
any universe with matter could not immediately find itself in the state of exponential 
expansion given in (I.1), since at small spatial separations, the effective repulsion due 
to the cosmological constant is negligible. Thus, in any realistic universe, after a 
transitional period between matter-domination and vacuum-domination, exponential 
expansion sets in and the cosmological event horizon (surface impassable to causal 
influences, similar to event horizons of black holes) is formed. The size of the 
cosmological event horizon is given as:   
 
5.0
195.0
0 7.0
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Λ−−
Λ 

 Ω×=Ω= h
H
cRh pc.   (I.2)  
 
Beyond this distance no communication is possible at any time. This is very different 
from the situation in the matter-dominated universes, where the contribution of the 
cosmological constant is very small or completely vanishing, where there are only so-
called particle horizons, representing temporary obstacles to communication (i.e. any 
two arbitrarily chosen points will get into a region of causal influence in finite future 
time). 
The minimal temperature of the exponentially expanding (de Sitter) universe 
characterized by the cosmological constant Λ is given by the equation (Gibbons and 
Hawking 1977): 
 
7.0
103.3
12
30
2
Λ−
Λ
Ω×≈Λ=→ h
k
cTT π
h  K,    (I. 3) 
 
where k is the Boltzmann constant. Roughly speaking, this is the temperature of the 
black-body radiation with maximal emissivity at wavelengths equal to the 
cosmological event horizon. Modern observations indicate that the expression under 
the square root on the right-hand side of (I. 2) is close to unity, and h ≈ 0.6. Therefore, 
this temperature is low beyond description, but as longer and longer timescales in the 
future unfold, its finite value precludes the asymptotic process (1/T → ∞) of the 
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lowering metabolic rate of intelligent creatures of the far future suggested by Dyson 
(1979) as a method for achieving immortality (Krauss and Starkman 2000). 
 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
Ironically enough, it would not be difficult to confuse the classical steady-state 
cosmology with the Λ-dominated ones if the level of sophistication of (neo)classical 
cosmological tests (e.g. Sandage 1988) were not very high. Namely, the major 
observational parameter used in empirical discrimination between world models is the 
decceleration parameter q0, defined as  
 
 20 •
••
−=
R
RRq ,       (II.1) 
 
where R is the cosmological scaling factor. Of course, this definition is not of much 
practical value. Instead, it can be shown that in standard relativistic Friedmann-
Robertson-Walker cosmologies, q0 is related to densities in matter and vacuum in the 
following way (with the usual assumption of negligible pressure): 
 
ΛΩ−Ω= 20
mq ,      (II.2) 
 
which delivers the “classical”  value of 0.5 for the Einstein-de Sitter model (Ω = Ωm = 
1, ΩΛ = 0), but becomes strongly negative for the vacuum-dominated models. In 
particular, for the extreme model considered above (Ωm = 0.1, ΩΛ = 0.9), we have  
 
 q0 = – 0.85.       (II.3) 
 
It is well-known that, on the other hand, the decceleration parameter in the steady-
state model is  
 
q0 = const. = – 1.      (II.4) 
 
Obviously, the last two values are close enough for the clear and unequivocal 
discrimination between them to be an extremely hard observational task.  
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i The latter presents a separate problem, far from being solved in the field of anthropic thinking. What 
constitutes a reference class is by no mean clear, and some recent discussions (from different 
premises!) can be found in Bostrom (2001) and Olum (2001).  
ii We tacitly assume that Θ is well defined for each history. This conjecture may be impossible to 
prove, but it does seem plausible in the light of our belief that the reference class problem will 
eventually be solved.  
iii The important assumption here is that the histories of intelligent species are ergodic, i.e. that the 
ensemble averaging is the same as temporal averaging. Since ergodicity conjectures are notoriously 
difficult to prove even for simple physical systems, we cannot hope to improve upon this assumption in 
the present case. Note, however, that most transhumanist issues are inherently ergodic. 
iv From the mathematical point of view, such transformation should be non-singular except possibly at 
the boundary of the relevant region. Such is the case with usually suggested transformations; for 
instance, in the classical Milne universe, we have the connection between the two timescales as τ = t0 ln 
(t/t0) + t0, where t0 is a constant (e.g. Milne 1940). The zero point of t-time occurs in the infinite past of 
τ-time. 
v Although, of course, such a future could hardly be called eschatological, since physical eschatology is 
trivial in an unchanging universe. In addition, there is an entire host of very problematic features of the 
steady state theory following from the application of the Strong Anthropic Principle, since the very 
absence of obstacles to unlimited growth of civilizations in such a universe would be the clear sign that 
there must be a factor sharply limiting their growth—since we have not perceived advanced 
civilizations of arbitrary age in our past light cone  (Tipler 1982; Barrow and Tipler 1986). For the 
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purposes of our present discussion, however, we are justified in neglecting this complication, since it is 
always possible to imagine a logically consistent cosmological model that very slowly passes from a 
quasi-stationary to an evolutionary phase (similar to the historically interesting Eddington-Lemaître 
model; see Ćirković 2000).  
vi It is possible that the number of filtered observer-moments is very small in a typical case. This would 
give rise to the “Great Filter” (cf. Hanson 1998b), explaining the “Great Silence” (cf. Brin 1983) and 
Fermi's paradox. 
